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What Determines Individual Preferences over Reform?
Microeconomic Evidence from Russia
STEPHANIE EBLE and PETYA KOEVA*
This paper provides empirical evidence on the determinants of individual reform
preferences in Russia after the August 1998 crisis. We analyze the response pattern
to survey questions about the individual's support of returning to socialism and stop-
ping market reforms in a bivariate probit framework. Two possible explanations for
the observed preferences are considered. First, personal attitudes toward reform are
affected by the individuals' economic gains or losses during transition. Second, as
established by research in sociology, some societal groups are more flexible than
others in adapting to changes in their environment. The empirical results, which
focus on the effect of age, education, labor market status, income levels and income
changes on the likelihood of opposing reform, give support to both hypotheses.
Interestingly, we also find a strong regional variation in reform attitudes. Controlling
for individual characteristics, we establish that people who live in high-arrears
regions are more likely to oppose the reform process. Furthermore, the regional
income level, ethnic composition, oil production and crime rate are significantly
related to the market reform orientation of the regions' residents. [JEL P26]
T
his paper provides new empirical evidence on the determinants of individual
reform preferences in Russia. We consider two explanations of how these pref-
erences are formed. Under the first hypothesis, the personal attitude towards
reform depends on whether the individual gains or loses (in economic terms)
during the transition process. Microeconomic data from 1994 until 1998 are used
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to establish the profile of economic winners and losers.
1 The second hypothesis is
based on sociological explanations of individual reform preferences. Evidence
from this literature suggests that some societal groups are more flexible than
others in changing their political attitudes and ideological beliefs. In addition, we
consider the effect of regional economic and social conditions on the support for
reform offered by the regions' residents.
The empirical analysis is conducted using a representative sample of Russia.
The information about individuals' attitude towards reform comes from Round 8 of
the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), conducted only a few months
after the August 1998 crisis. The general position of respondents on the political and
economic reforms undertaken during the transition period can be inferred from their
answers to two survey questions about reform. The first question captures the indi-
vidual's opinion of the reform process in general, without distinguishing between
the economic and noneconomic changes in the society. The second question, on the
other hand, focuses on the individual's attitude towards market reform only.
The empirical model is estimated in two different ways. In the first approach,
the dependent variables are used to estimate two univariate probit models. The
advantage of this method is that we lose only a few nonresponse observations and
can address potential sample selection problems. The second approach involves
the estimation of a bivariate probit model, which computes the joint and marginal
probabilities of supporting the return to socialism and the end of market reforms.
The main contributions of our paper are as follows. First, we use a rich
microeconomic dataset that includes direct measures of reform preferences and
comprehensive individual-level and regional-level information. In contrast, most
previous economic studies draw inferences about reform preferences from indirect
measures such as the observed pattern of voting (Brainerd, 1998; Fidrmuc, 2000;
and Kapstein and Milanovic, 2000). Since the correspondence between prefer-
ences and actions is not always one-to-one, we give preference to our direct
measures of reform attitudes. When direct measures of reform preferences are
available (see, for example, Hayo, 2001; and Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992), indi-
vidual-level demographic and socioeconomic data are scant. Second, our empir-
ical analysis draws on two streams of research and offers a simultaneous treatment
of the economic and sociological determinants of reform preferences. We do not
consider our results to be direct tests of the economic and ideology hypotheses of
the formation of reform preferences. However, we can interpret our findings in
light of these two lines of thought. Third, we contribute to the literature on the
relationship between regional performance and individual reform attitudes in
Russia, in particular, by examining the effect of local economic conditions on the
reform-mindedness of the different regions' residents.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, better-
educated people are more likely to oppose the return to socialism and the end of
market reforms. The findings suggest that economic factors are not sufficient to
explain the observed pattern of reform attitude, that is, ideology plays an impor-
tant role as well.
'Brainerd (1998) provides evidence for the initial period of transition (1991-94).
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Second, age has a strong effect on the probability of opposing reform, even
after controlling for income and other socioeconomic characteristics. The
evidence also yields support to the ideology hypothesis, which predicts that old
people would be less likely to accept and support the changes in their environment.
Third, the labor market status of the respondents plays an important role in
shaping preferences toward reform. Private sector workers (especially those
employed in the banking sector) are more likely to be proreform, conditional on
their wage and nonwage income. These results are consistent with the notion that
the economic gains made during transition have an effect on the individual propen-
sity to support the reform process.
Fourth, the strongest support for the economic hypothesis comes from exam-
ining the coefficients of the subjective and objective variables that reflect the changes
in the individual's standard of living, including as a consequence of the 1998 Russian
crisis. Respondents who say that they lived better five years before are more likely to
oppose reform than those who didn't. The most important finding is that people who
experienced losses in their relative income or consumption level between 1994-96
were more likely to prefer the old socialist regime. Interestingly, respondents who
suffered large income or consumption losses during the 1998 Russian crisis were not
more likely to be against market reforms. In contrast, respondents who had an abso-
lute income gain during the same period were more likely to be proreform.
Fifth, the level of enterprise arrears in the region has a strong impact on the prob-
ability that the residents of the region support the reform process. Even after control-
ling for the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the individuals in the
sample, people who live in high-arrears regions are more likely to be in favor of
returning to socialism and stopping market reform than those who inhabit low-
arrears regions. Furthermore, residents of oil-producing regions are significantly
more likely to be against market reform. On the other hand, other economic indica-
tors of regional performance, such as the local unemployment rate and private sector
size, do not have a statistically significant effect on the individual reform preference.
I. Literature Survey
The labor market winners and losers during the early stage of the economic transi-
tion in Russia are identified in Brainerd (1998). Using monthly survey wage data
from 1991, 1993, and 1994, the author finds that the returns to education increased,
the returns to experience fell, and the female-male wage differential (unadjusted for
hours) widened. By analyzing the link between wage loss during transition and
voting preferences of individuals during the December 1993 parliamentary elec-
tions, she finds that the predicted loss in wages had little effect on the voting
behavior. Kapstein and Milanovic (2000) analyze the relationship between indi-
vidual characteristics and the probability of voting pro-Yeltsin during the 1996
presidential elections. They establish that the younger, better educated, and richer
individuals tended to vote for Yeltsin.
2
2The data source for both papers (Brainerd, 1998; and Kapstein and Milanovic, 2000) is a series of
cross-section household surveys conducted by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research.
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Based on parliamentary election results in Central Europe, Fidrmuc (2000)
identifies socioeconomic groups that give their political support to pro-reform or
anti-reform parties. Using county-level data from the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Slovakia, Fidrmuc finds that regions with a high proportion of private
entrepreneurs, white-collar workers, and university-educated voters are more
likely to vote for pro-reform parties. Anti-reform parties are popular in counties
with a large fraction of retirees, unemployed, blue-collar, and agricultural workers.
The results also suggest that anti-reform parties do very well in rural areas, espe-
cially in Slovakia and Poland.
Hayo (2000) emphasizes the effect of inflation on the public support for
reform in Eastern and Central Europe. The author uses data from the Central and
Eastern Euro-Barometer surveys to document the evolution of support for reform
over time. He finds that most of the macroeconomic variables (with the notable
exception of inflation) do not have a significant effect on the public support for
reform during transition.
The question of public support for political change in Russia was addressed in
the political science and sociology literature as well. An early study by Finifter and
Mickiewicz (1992) uses a national public opinion survey conducted in 1989. The
paper establishes a positive relationship between education and support for polit-
ical change, which is partly attributed to "[that] highly educated individuals are
more tolerant of political deviance and more likely to engage in political partici-
pation." The authors also emphasize that the support for reform declines consis-
tently with age, and explain their finding with the reluctance of aged people to
change their attitudes, as well as the "generation effect" of undergoing early adult-
hood socialization and attitude formation during the Stalin regime.
3
The determinants of two measures of support for democracy in Central and
Eastern Europe—the rejection of authoritarian alternatives and the positive assess-
ment of the current regime—are analyzed in Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (1998).
The authors report that political rather than economic variables explain the support
for democracy, as measured by the rejection of authoritarian alternatives.
However, changes in GDP have a strong significant effect on the approval of the
current system.
II. Theoretical Framework
Economic Determinants of Reform Preferences
One possible framework of thinking about the determinants of individual attitudes
toward reform is provided by simple economic reasoning. The premise of this
approach is that each reform process generates winners and losers. The support for
the reform in question depends on the net benefit that each individual receives
3The attitudinal legacy of the socialist period is examined in the economics literature as well.
Blanchflower and Freeman (1997) analyze its effect on labor relations in former communist countries.
The opinions of New York and Moscow residents toward the free market are compared in Shiller, Boycko,
and Korobov (1991). The same authors analyze the attitudinal differences between individuals from ex-
communist and western countries (Shiller, Boycko, and Korobov (1992)).
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from its implementation.
4 The link between economic benefits and individual atti-
tudes is what we call "the economic hypothesis."
In this paper, we focus on the winners and losers in the Russian labor market.
Our expectation is that individuals and groups that experienced economic losses
in the labor market during transition would be more likely to be against the reform
process. The opposite would be true of the winners.
The changes in the wage structure in Russia are illustrated using the results
from Brainerd (1998) for the period between 1991 and 1994 and cross-sectional
data from the RLMS for the period from 1994 to 1998. The estimation is done
using a standard human capital specification, as in Brainerd (1998). The results are
shown in Table 1. The estimates in panel A indicate that the returns to university
education relative to specialized secondary education for men increased from
8.3 percent in 1991 to 21.9 percent in 1998. The returns to primary education, on
the other hand, experienced a monotonic decline from -7.1 percent in 1991 to
-54.6 percent in 1998. The regression in panel B reveals that the education
premium rose for women as well. The returns to primary education relative to
specialized secondary education fell from -14.1 percent in 1991 to -53.1 percent
in 1998. Also, over the period from 1991 to 1998, the returns to experience
declined, and the male/female wage gap increased (results not shown).
5 Given this
pattern of changes in wages, we anticipate that the support for reform would be
increasing with the educational level of individuals, and decreasing with their age.
In addition, women should be more opposed to market reforms than men.
Ideological Determinants of Reform Preferences
The second hypothesis is based on theoretical and empirical work in sociology. In
particular, we focus our attention on the theories of "generational succession"
(Mannheim, 1952; Ryder, 1965; Carlson and Karlsson, 1970), "generational
persistence" (Sears, 1987), and "aging-stability" (Glenn, 1980) that highlight the
importance of age and cohort in the formation of personal attitudes. According to
Alwin and Krosnick (1991), "peoples' attitudes are considered to be shaped by
socialization experiences early in adulthood and to remain relatively resistant to
changes after this time. Differences between generations in terms of social and
political circumstances and formal socialization experiences produce potentially
different attitudinal perspectives." The general premise in these theories is that
"the stability of attitudes is the lowest during the impressionable years of young
adulthood, growing in magnitude over the life cycle, with a possible decrement in
the growth of attitude stability in the latest years" (Alwin and Krosnick, 1991).
6
4The feasibility of reforms based on political economy considerations has been the subject of
numerous papers (see Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), for example).
5This is consistent with the findings of Keane and Prasad (2000) for Poland.
6The inflexibility of peoples' attitudes with the progression of their life-cycle has been documented by
Alwin, Cohen and Newcomb (1991), Marwell, Aiken and Demerath (1987), Fendrich and Lovoy (1988)
and others. The relationship between generations and ideological change is also discussed by Roberts and
Lang (1985). In the Russian context, the importance of age and generational effects on the public support
for political change has been mentioned by Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), as discussed in Section I.
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Table 1. Returns to Education and Experience (1991-98)










































































































































































































































































Notes: 1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 2. Significance levels of 5 percent and 1 percent
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The observation that old cohorts are more likely than younger ones to adhere
to their earlier political attitudes is emphasized by Cutler and Kaufman (1975).
The authors point out that "successive cohorts are socialized to different political
attitudes, values, and ideologies as the content of the political culture changes.
Associated with the subsequent movement of individual members of the cohorts
through the life cycle are psychologically based, age-related changes in the direc-
tion of greater rigidity, cautiousness, and increasing resistance to change."
The main prediction of the ideological hypothesis for our empirical analysis is
that older cohorts in Russia are more likely to adhere to their socialist beliefs and
express their preference toward moving backward and not proceeding with the
reform process.
III. Data
The information about the individual's attitude towards reform comes from Round
8 of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (1992-99).
7 We measure the
preferences for reform by the responses to the following two questions:
Question 1. "In looking back on the past ten years, what do you think, do we
need to return everything to the way it was before Gorbachev, to socialism, should
we maintain the present course without change, or repair, or adjust the present
course? R1) Return everything to the way it was before Gorbachev, to socialism;
R2) Stay on the present course; R3) Repair, adjust present course; R4) Doesn't
know; R5) Refuses to answer."
Question 2. "Which of the choices below best describes market reform in your
opinion? R1) Market reform needs to cease; R2) Market reform should continue,
as it is; R3) Market reform ought to be carried out some other way; R4) Doesn't
know; R5) Refuses to answer."
The general position of respondents on the political and economic reforms
undertaken during the transition period can be inferred from the answers to these
questions. The first question captures the individual's opinion of the reform
process in general, without distinguishing between the economic and noneco-
nomic changes in the Russian society. The second question, on the other hand,
focuses on the individual's attitude towards market reform only.
The responses to Question 1 and Question 2 are presented in Table 2. The raw
numbers suggest that only a few people are in favor of the status quo. Most respon-
dents would like the reform process to continue, although in another way.
Considering the timing of the survey, this result is not surprising. The survey partic-
ipants were interviewed in the period between October 1998 and January 1999, that
is, only months after the August crisis.
8 The response rates are relatively high—
7The survey was conducted by researchers from the Population Center at University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill, with the corroboration of the Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of
Science, Paragon Research International, the Russian Center for Preventive Medicine, the Russian
Institute of Nutrition at the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, and the State Statistical Bureau
(Goskomstat). The detailed description of the sampling design is given on the RLMS website at
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms/project/sampling.html.
8Most of the interviews (79.2 percent) were conducted in November 1998. In the empirical analysis,
we include dummy variables for the month of the interview.
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Table 2. Description of Responses to Survey Questions

























R1. Return to socialism/
stop market reform
R2. Stay on present course/
continue market reform as it is
R3. Adjust present course/




Note: See text for exact wording of the questions.
90.1 percent for Question 1 and 82.2 percent for Question 2. Using these data, we
construct two dichotomous variables, StopCourse and StopMarket. Each variable is
equal to 1 if the individual's response was R1 and 0 otherwise (see Table 2).
According to this definition, the people who support reform are those who don't
want the reform process to be reverted.
The cross-tabulated values of StopCourse and StopMarket are shown in Table
3. Interestingly, a relatively large proportion of the respondents (13.6 percent of the
entire sample) say that they are in favor of returning to socialism {StopCourse = 1 ),
but they don't want market reforms to stop (StopMarket = 0). One interpretation of
this result is that although people are in favor of economic reforms, their attitude
towards socialism is driven solely by ideological considerations. A second possi-
bility is that classification error is responsible for the observed outcome. The most
plausible explanation, however, is that the respondents do not have a clear notion
of what market reform means. In contrast, the question about the return of socialism
is well-defined and specific for most of the respondents who lived through the pre-
reform period. This explanation is supported by the fact that a large proportion of
individuals in this "mixed" category are aged between 60 and 70.
Definitions and summary statistics for some of the explanatory variables are
presented in Table 4.
9 Most demographic variables come from the individual adult
file for Round 8 of the RLMS. The asset variables are derived from the household
file. The income group dummies are based on the total household income,
constructed as a sum of the nominal monthly income of the household members,
divided by the minimum nominal monthly expenditures needed to keep the family
from falling below the regional poverty line during the month of the interview. The
economic rank variables are constructed using the respondents' answers to the
9The data documentation provides sample weights, although "the net effect of nonresponse attrition
and change in dwelling unit occupants across rounds on the marginal characteristics of the observed cross-
sectional samples is modest." The empirical analysis is conducted in two ways, with and without using
the sample weights. The estimation results are robust with respect to both specifications. We present the
estimation results using the unweighted sample only.
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Table 4. Definitions and Summary Statistics of Selected Variables:






Individual responds R1 to
Question 1 (see Table 2 and text)
Individual responds R1 to


































<19 years of age in November 1998
>20 and <29 years of age in November 1998
>30 and <39 years of age in November 1998
>40 and <49 years of age in November 1998
>50 and <59 years of age in November 1998
>60 and < 69 years of age in November 1998
>70 years of age in November 1998
Attended school for < 6 years





Individual lives in a city
Individual lives in a "village of a city type"
Individual lives in a village





































Similarly, let M* denote the difference between the costs and benefits of
market reform for individual i. Assume that M* is a linear function of economic
and sociological determinants.
i = A/P2 + 82/, (3)
where Xi is a vector of observed variables and 82 is a normally distributed error
term with mean zero and variance o\. The observed attitude toward market reform
is given by the indicator StopMarketi:
































C. Household Income and Asset Variables
Income is <0.5 of regional poverty line
Income is >0.5 and <1 of regional poverty line
Income is >1 and <1.5 of regional poverty line
Income is > 1.5 and <2 of regional poverty line
Income is >2 of regional poverty line
Individual's household owns a car
Individual's household owns a color TV
Individual's household owns a VCR
Individual's household owns a country house
Individual's household has access to land
for home production
D. Subjective Variables
Reports he/she lived better 5 year ago
Reports he/she lived the same 5 year ago
Reports he/she lived worse 5 year ago
Expects he/she will live better in 1 year
Expects he/she will live the same in 1 year
Expects he/she will live worse in 1 year
Step 1 (lowest) of a 9-step income ladder
Step 2 of a 9-step income ladder
Step 3 of a 9-step income ladder
Step 4 of a 9-step income ladder
Step 5 of a 9-step income ladder
Step 6 of a 9-step income ladder
Step 7 of a 9-step income ladder
Step 8 of a 9-step income ladder



























































1 (stop market reform) if M/ > 0
10 (don't stop market reform) if M* < 0
(4)
We estimate the empirical model in two different ways. In the first approach,
equations (1)-(4) are used to estimate two univariate probit models. The advan-
tage of this method is that we lose only a few nonresponse observations (see Table
3). In addition, we can address potential sample selection problems. The estima-
tion of a probit model with sample selection is discussed in Van de Ven and Van
Praag (1981). The authors propose a correction that is analogous to Heckman's
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procedure. Their method involves estimating the main equation and the selection
equation simultaneously, in a bivariate probit framework, and testing for the pres-
ence of sample selection.
In the second approach, we estimate StopCoursei and StopMarketi as a
bivariate probit model. The underlying assumption of this model specification is




 p '71 (5)
3 J
The four sample outcomes, determined by different combinations of
StopCoursei and StopMarketi, give rise to the following likelihood function:
= II Pr(StopCoursei = 1, StopMarketi = 1) x II Pr(StopCoursei = 1, StopMarketi = 0) (6)
x II Pr(StopCoursei = 0, StopMarketi = 1) x II Pr(StopCoursei = 0, StopMarket. = 0),
where Nj denotes the size of the relevant subsample. Let r|1i = Eu/C] and
r\2i = tiilGi- Denote the standard bivariate normal density by (|)(.) = (|>(niiJl2/;p).
Then equation (6) can be written as:
II J J KOdnA x II J J*-)*Wft!1i CD
-xiB1 oo -xiB1 -xiB2 II J J <K.)*i2idnli x II j J <K0*i2idn1i
The likelihood function is maximized with respect to the normalized coeffi-
cients B1 and B2, as well as the correlation coefficient p. Using the bivariate probit
estimates, we compute the joint and marginal probabilities of supporting the return
to socialism and the end of market reforms.
1
1 The problem with the bivariate esti-
mation is that we lose approximately 20 percent of the observations in the sample.
This listwise deletion, however, leads to inefficiency. If the data are not missing at
random, the coefficient estimates would be biased as well. To address this issue,
we employ a multiple imputation procedure. This approach leads to consistency
under the assumption that the data are missing randomly conditional on the data
included in the imputation procedure. The method used in this paper is called
"hotdeck imputation" (see Mander and Clayton (1999)). The missing data are
imputed stochastically, using the approximate Bayesian bootstrap method of
Rubin and Schenker (1986). The standard errors are corrected for the use of the
imputation procedure.
11 Alternatively, we could estimate a multivariate logit model (see Amemiya, 1981).
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Another econometric issue arises if group-specific variables, such as regional
unemployment rate or family assets, are included in individual-level regressions.
In this case, their standard errors will be biased downward (Moulton (1990)). We
address this problem by taking into account the clustering of the data in the
computation of the standard errors.
V. Empirical Results
Explaining Individual Reform Preferences
Education. The effect of education on the reform preferences of individuals is
examined first. The baseline specification of our empirical model is shown in Table
5. We report two sets of results, obtained from the estimation of the univariate and
bivariate models discussed in the previous section. For the sake of brevity, we
discuss the bivariate probit estimates only. The explanatory variables in Table 5 are
age, education, gender, settlement type, region, and month-of-interview dummies.
The educational level of each respondent has a significant effect on the probability
of favoring the return to socialism. Individuals who have primary education are
approximately 15 percent more likely than vocational school graduates to prefer the
revival of socialism. The likelihood of supporting the old socialist regime declines
by 5 percent and 11 percent for secondary school and specialized school graduates,
respectively. University-educated people, on the other hand, are about 24 percent
more likely to oppose the return to socialism than people with vocational training
only. In other words, the support for reform increases with the educational level of
the respondents. This pattern is consistent with the changes in the returns to educa-
tion during the transition period shown in Table 1.
We check the robustness of these results by adding income and asset variables
to the baseline specification. Although the magnitude of the educational variables
declines, their coefficients are still statistically significant. Since the returns to
education may vary with gender, settlement type, and age, we include interaction
terms to account for these effects.
1
2
One important finding is the robust effect of university education on reform
attitudes. Interestingly, the effect of university does not change when we restrict
the sample to include only retirees, that is, people who are out of the labor force,
and control for their income (see Table 6). Compared to vocational school gradu-
ates, university-educated retirees are approximately 31 percent less likely to favor
the return to socialism and 22 percent more likely to favor market reforms. These
findings point to the significance of ideology in influencing the decision of highly
educated people to support the reform process.
Age. The marginal probabilities of the age dummies in Table 5 follow an inter-
esting pattern. The probability of favoring the return to socialism and the discon-
tinuation of market reforms increases almost monotonically with age. In
particular, people who are below 20 are 27 percent more likely to reject socialism
than people aged between 40 and 50. The effect of the same dummy (Age1) on the
likelihood of supporting market reform is 0.15.
12The results are available upon request.
99Stephanie Eble and Petya Koeva
Table 5. The Effect of Age and Education on Reform Preferences














































































































































































































































































Notes: 1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 2. Significance levels of 5 percent and 1 percent are denoted by (*) and
(**), respectively. 3. The reference category for education is vocational education. 4. The columns Socialism and Market reform
denote preferences to return to socialism (StopCourse = 1) and to stop market reform (StopMarket - 1), respectively.
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Notes: 1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 2. Significance levels of 5 percent and 1 percent are denoted
by (*) and (**), respectively. 3. The reference category for education is vocational education. 4. The columns Socialism
and Market reform denote preferences to return to socialism (StopCourse = 1) and to stop market reform (StopMarket
= 1), respectively.
The specification in Table 5, however, does not reveal if this outcome occurs
because of the decline in the returns to experience during transition or the inherent
resistance of old people to accept changes in their environment. We control for the
income and asset position of the respondents and still find the presence of the age
effect.
1
3 More specifically, younger respondents are again less likely to resist
reform. These empirical findings can be easily reconciled with the presence of
generational effects in the formation of people's attitudes and values.
1
3 The estimation results are available upon request.
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Notes: 1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 2. Significance levels of 5 percent and 1 percent are
denoted by (*) and (**), respectively. 3. The reference category for sector of employment is manufacturing. 4. The
columns Socialism and Market reform denote preferences to return to socialism {StopCourse = 1) and to stop
market reform (StopMarket = 1), respectively.
Labor Market Characteristics. The importance of labor market characteris-
tics, such as employment status, industry of employment and enterprise owner-
ship, is considered next. We restrict the sample to include only those individuals
who are in the labor force, and estimate three different specifications. Both income
and demographic variables are used as explanatory variables. The estimation
results are presented in Table 7. The coefficient estimates imply that individuals
employed in the finance sector are consistently more likely to support the reform
process than individuals employed in manufacturing. The magnitude of this effect
is between 10 and 15 percent, depending on the specification. The effect of
working in the private sector is analogous, although the results are significant only
for the return-to-socialism specification.
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Economic Gains and Losses. The most direct test of the economic hypothesis
is to examine whether the individual preferences over reform are affected by
changes in the economic well-being of respondents during the transition period.
Round 8 of RLMS contains questions whether the respondents lived better, worse
or the same 5 years before the interview, and whether they expect their standard of
living to improve in the next 12 months. These variables are incorporated in our
baseline regression. The marginal probability estimates are shown in column (1)
of Table 8. In Table 8, the reference categories are LivedSame and ExpectSame.
The results indicate that people who claim that they lived better before were
approximately 11 percent more likely to be anti-reform than those who said that
they lived in the same way. In addition, individuals who expect to have a lower
standard of living in 12 months are 12 percent more likely to favor the return to
socialism and 6 percent more likely to oppose market reforms.
The specifications in column (1) and column (2) of Table 8 are identical. The
difference between the estimates of the four subjective variables comes from the
fact that the sample in column (2) is restricted to include only those individuals
who appear in Rounds 5-8 of the RLMS. The sample size decreases from 5,468
to 3,124 observations. We use the income and consumption data provided in the
different rounds of the survey to construct absolute and relative measures of the
real income and consumption changes experienced by individuals during the
period from 1994 until 1998. The coefficient estimates of these variables tell us
that individuals who moved down in the distribution of income between 1994 and
1996 are 6 percent more likely to support the return to socialism. The corre-
sponding coefficient for relative consumption losses is also significant. Its magni-
tude suggests that individuals who moved down in the distribution of real
consumption between 1994 and 1996 are 5 percent more likely to favor the return
to socialism. Another result is that the absolute income loss between 1996 and
1998 has a significant positive effect on the propensity to prefer the old regime. A
10 percent decline in real income between 1996 and 1998 is associated with a 1
percentage-point drop in the support for market reform. Note that the August crisis
occurred during this period.
Explaining Regional Reform Preferences
The estimation results from the previous section reveal that there is a considerable
amount of regional variation in the attitude towards reform that cannot be explained
by the characteristics of their residents, as the regional dummies are strongly signif-
icant in all specifications. In this section, our objective is to relate the varying
degree of support for reform to a number of regional economic factors.
1
4
14The relationship between regional economic performance and reform attitude has been analyzed in
the literature. For example, Mau and Stupin (1997) establish that proreform regions have higher unem-
ployment and nominal income than antireform regions. Van Selm (1998) finds some evidence that conser-
vative regions experienced a stronger decline in industrial output than liberal ones. According to
Grigoriev, Nagaev, and Woergoetter (1994), regions with higher income per capita, level of urbanization,
and favorable industry structure were more likely to vote for proreform parties during the 1993 constitu-
tional referendum.
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Table 8. The Effect of Economic Gains and Losses on Reform Attitudes
(Marginal probabilities)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Market Market Market




























































































































































































































Notes: 1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 2. Significance levels of 5 percent and 1 percent are denoted by (*)
and (**), respectively. 3. The columns Socialism and Market reform denote preferences to return to socialism (StopCourse = 1)
and to stop market reform (StopMarket = 1), respectively.
aUpward movement between income groups, constructed with respect to region-specific poverty line.
bPercentage change in real per adult household income. Nominal income is deflated by region-specific poverty line.
cUpward movement between consumption groups, constructed with respect to region-specific poverty line.
dPercentage change in real per adult household consumption.
eAge, education, settlement, and gender dummies.
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The level of regional income, unemployment rate and industrial restructuring
are considered in order to capture the macroeconomic conditions in the regions.
The oil-abundant Khanty-Mansiiskij region has the highest nominal income per
adult. The poorest region in our sample is the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, which
is also one of the most conservative regions in the sample. The unemployment
rate is below 6 percent in Nizhnij Novgorod, Kalinin Oblast, and Cheliabinsk
Oblast, and above 15 percent in Pezenskaya Oblast, Kabardino-Balkar Republic,
and Tambov Oblast. In our classification, the last three regions fall consistently
in the antireform category. On the other hand, not all regions with low unem-
ployment rates are proreform.
The impact of enterprise arrears, industry and ownership composition and
foreign investment in the region is analyzed as well. The highest proportion of the
working population affected by enterprise arrears can be found in the Kabardino-
Balkar Republic as well. The level of foreign investment, measured by the fraction
of the working population employed in foreign-owned enterprises, is non-negli-
gible in Altaiskij Krai (Kur'inskij Rajon), Moscow City, Kalinin Oblast, Tatarstan,
Krasnodar, Vladivostok, and Orenburg Oblast. All of these regions show no pref-
erence for stopping market reform. The share of workers employed in the service
sector is used as a proxy for industrial structure. We also control for the ethnic
composition and crime rate of each region. Finally, we construct a regional
dummy for oil and natural gas extraction.
We include these region-specific variables in our probit regressions instead of
the regional dummies, and correct their standard errors for clustering.
1
5 The
advantage of our approach is that it takes into account the effect of compositional
factors, that is, the age, education, settlement type and income of the population
on the public support for reform in the given region.
1
6
The bivariate probit coefficients of the regional variables are shown in
column 1 and column 2 of Table 9. The corresponding marginal and joint proba-
bilities are presented in the next four columns. Individual-specific covariates
(same as in the previous subsection) are included in the regression, but their coef-
ficients are not reported.
15We also conduct our analysis using a two-step methodology, as in Di Telia, MacCulloch, and
Oswald (2001). In the first stage, we regress StopCourse on the individual-level demographic and socioe-
conomic variables for each of the 38 regions in the sample. The mean residuals of these regressions are
used as the dependent variable in the second stage of the estimation, which has the characteristics of the
regions as explanatory variables. The main findings of this section are qualitatively the same using this
estimation procedure.
16Previous studies have attempted to classify Russian regions into progressive (proreform) and
conservative (antireform) and relate the political attitude of the population to regional economic perfor-
mance and policies. On the basis of their enthusiasm for privatization, Hanson (1995) identifies as prore-
form the following regions: Stavropol, Tambov, Krasnodar, Rostov, Kemerovo, Omsk, St. Petersburg, and
Nizhny Novgorod. In the paper by Mau and Stupin (1997), St. Petersburg, Novogorod, Samara, Rostov,
and Chuvash Republic are progressive regions, whereas Ulyanovsk, Tatarstan, Voronezh, Krasnodar, and
Stavropol are conservative regions. Using the results from the constitutional referendum on December 12,
1993, Grigoriev, Nagaev, and Woergoetter (1994) also identify proreform and antireform regions. In their
classification, Tambov and Chuvash Republic are among the conservative regions. In contrast to these
studies, we analyze the attitudinal differences towards reform at the regional level in a statistical frame-
work that controls for effect of individual-specific demographic and socioeconomic factors.
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Notes: 1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are adjusted for clustering by region.
2. Significance levels of 5 percent and 1 percent are denoted by (*) and (**), respectively. 4. The columns
Socialism and Market reform denote preferences to return to socialism (StopCourse = 1) and to stop market
reform (StopMarket =1), respectively.
aJoint probability of supporting the return to socialism and the end of market reform:
Prob(StopCourse = 1 and StopMarket = 1).
bThe regression contains the following individual-level covariates: age, education, settlement type,
gender, income, assets, and month-of-interview dummies.
The empirical results suggest that residents of high-arrears regions are more
likely to favor the return to socialism. The coefficient estimate of Arrears is posi-
tive and statistically significant in both equations.
1
7 Therefore, respondents from
high-arrears regions are also more likely to oppose market reforms, even after
controlling for their own socioeconomic status. In other words, the resistance to
political and economic reforms is greater in regions with a higher proportion of
employees who haven't been paid for their work.
1
8 The marginal probability esti-
mate of Socialism indicates that a one-standard deviation increase in Arrears from
17We run the same regression in a sample that includes only employed individuals, and add dummies
for receiving wages during the last month, industry, and enterprise ownership. The region-specific vari-
able Arrears remains positive and significant.
18The results do not change if we incorporate pension arrears in our computation of Arrears.
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its mean value of 0.20 to 0.30 raises the probability of favoring the return to
socialism by 0.06 on average. The effect of the same change in enterprise arrears
on the probability of opposing market reforms is almost identical in magnitude.
The coefficient of regional nominal income is negative and statistically signifi-
cant in the market reform equation. Hence, residents of poor regions are more likely
to oppose market reforms. The marginal probability coefficient of Income implies
that a hundred-ruble increase in the nominal income of the region is associated with
a decline in the probability of opposing market reforms of 0.02, on average. Note
that the effect of nominal income is insignificant in the socialism equation.
1
9
Contrary to our expectations, the regional unemployment rate, industry struc-
ture, decline in manufacturing sector, foreign investment and ownership structure
have no significant effect on the likelihood that an individual would have a nega-
tive attitude towards reform. The coefficient estimate of the unemployment rate,
however, becomes insignificant only after the variable Arrears is included in the
regression.
2
0 Furthermore, the extent of privatization in the region, captured by the
variable Private, has no significant effect on the probability of opposing the
reform process in all specifications. The same is true for foreign investment.
Hence, we cannot establish a link between the attitude of respondents towards
reform and the privatization and foreign investment policies of their regions.
The estimate of the variable Crime from the market reform equation suggests
that the residents of regions with lower crime rates are more likely to have pro-
reform views. The proportion of ethnic Russians in the population, that is, the vari-
able Ethnic, has a statistically significant effect on the probability of opposing
market reform. The sign of the coefficient implies that an increase in the propor-
tion of ethnic Russians in the population is related to a lower probability of
supporting market reform. The size of this effect, however, is small. The oil
production variable has a significant effect on the probability of giving an affir-
mative answer to the StopMarket question as well. The result that oil-abundant
regions are more likely to be antireform is hardly surprising, since the pressure to
reform may be smaller for oil-abundant regions.
The main finding of the empirical investigation in this subsection is that the
degree of regional exposure to arrears is highly correlated with the reform attitudes
of the residents of the region, that is, regions with a large proportion of workers
who have not received in-kind or wage payments during the last month, are more
likely to be antireform. This relationship emerges even after we control for other
characteristics of the regions (income level, unemployment rate, etc.) and their
residents. Our preferred explanation is that a given level of wage arrears causes the
regional reform attitude to be proreform or antireform. However, we cannot rule
out the possible endogeneity of these variables.
2
1
19The effect of nominal income becomes insignificant only after we control for the individual char-
acteristics of the respondents.
20The correlation coefficient between the variables Arrears and Unemployment is 0.61.
2
1 The standard solution to this problem is instrumental variables. Unfortunately, finding valid instru-
ments in our setting is a daunting task.
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VI. Conclusion
This paper examined the empirical determinants of the reform preferences of
Russian people. Our findings suggest that both economic and ideological factors
play a role in shaping individual attitudes toward reform. The validity of the
economic hypothesis is demonstrated in several ways. First, we establish that indi-
viduals who experienced a decline in their economic status during the transition
period were more likely to favor the return of the old regime. Second, we show
that the pattern of reform opposition across educational levels is consistent with
the changes in the returns to education during transition.
Our empirical results imply that ideology is partly responsible for the
observed pattern of reform preferences. The effect of age and university education
on the support for reform is robust across specifications. This result holds even
after we restrict our sample to include only retired individuals, that is, people who
are out of the labor force. We find that the resistance to reform increases (almost)
monotonically with age. This finding is not surprising if we recognize the impor-
tance of generational effects in the attitude formation.
Finally, we acknowledge the significance of regional economic factors in
explaining the attitudes toward reform of the regions' residents. Taking into
account the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents,
we find that people who live in high-arrears regions are more likely to oppose
reforms.
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